《哲学研究》讨论贴 第六周[讨论]

宇文光

规则见首贴

26－30

26.  One thinks that learning language consists in giving
names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to
colours. to pains. to moods, to numbers, etc.  To
repeat-naming is something like attaching a label to a
thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the  use of a
word. But what is it a preparation for?


27.  "We name things and then we can talk about them: can
refer to them in talk." \'As if what we did next were given
with the mere act of naming. As if there were only one thing
called "talking about a thing". Whereas in fact we do the
most various things with our sentences.

Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different
functions.
* Water!
* Away!
* Ow!
* Help!
* Fine!
* No!

Are you inclined still to call these words "names of
objects"?

In languages (2) and (8) there was no such thing as asking
something\'s name. This, with its correlate, ostensive
definition, is, we might say, a language-game on its own.
That is really to say: we are brought up, trained, to ask:
"What is that called?"-upon which the  name is given. And
there is also a language-game of inventing a name for
something, and hence of saying, "This is ...." and then
using the new name. (Thus, for example, children give names
to their dolls and then talk about them and to them. Think
in this connexion how singular is the use of a person\'s name
to call him!)


28.  Now one can ostensively define a proper name, the name
of a colour, the name of a material, a numeral, the name of
a point of the compass and so on. The definition of the
number two, "That is called \'two\' "--pointing to two nuts-is
perfectly exact. --But how can two be defined like that? The
person one gives the definition to doesn\'t know what one
wants to call "two"; he will suppose that "two" is the name
given to this group of nuts! He may suppose this; but
perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake;
when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might
understand it as a numeral. And he might equally well take
the name of a person, of which I give an ostensive
definition, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a
point of the compass. That is to say: an ostensive
definition can be variously interpreted in every case.


29.   Perhaps you say: two can only be ostensively defined
in this way: "This number is called \'two\' ". For the word
"number" here shews what place in language, in grammar, we
assign to the word. But this means that the word "number"
must be explained before the ostensive definition can be
understood.

--The word "number" in the definition does indeed shew this
place; does shew the post at which we station the word. And
we can prevent misunderstandings by saying: "This colour is
called so-and-so", "This length is called so-and-so", and so
on. That is to say: misunderstandings are sometimes averted
in this way. But is there only one way of taking the word
"colour" or "length"?-Well, they just need
defining.-Defining, then, by means of other words! And what
about the last definition in this chain? (Do not say: "There
isn\'t a \'last\' definition". That is just as if you
chose to say: "There isn\'t a last house in this road; one
can always build an additional one\'\'.)

Whether the word "number" is necessary in the ostensive
definition depends on whether
without it the other person takes the definition otherwise
than I wish. And that will depend on the circumstances under
which it is given, and on the person I give it to.

And how he \'takes\' the definition is seen in the use that he
makes of the word defined.


30.    So one might say: the ostensive definition explains
the use--the meaning--of the word when the overall role of
the word in language is clear. Thus if I know that someone
means to explain a
colour-word to me the ostensive definition "That is called
\'sepia\' " will help me to understand the word.

--And you can say this, so long as you do not forget that
all sorts of problems attach to the words "to know" or "to
be clear".

One has already to know (or be able to do) something in
order to be capable of asking a
thing\'s name. But what does one have to know?



footnote:

Could one define the word "red" by pointing to something
that was not red? That would be
as if one were supposed to explain the word "modest" to
someone whose English was weak, and one pointed to an
arrogant man and said "That man is not modest". That it is
ambiguous is no argument against such a method of
definition. Any definition can be misunderstood.

    But it might well be asked: are we still to call this
"definition"?-- For, of course, even if it has
the same practical consequences, the same effect on the
learner, it plays a different part in the calculus from what
we ordinarily call "ostensive definition" of the word "red".

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-9-13 22:56:36编辑过]

疯人院逃犯

发言:
1."命名就像给一个东西贴上标签".那么我们如何给颜色贴上标签?如何给声音贴上标签?如何给感觉贴上标签?
2.假设LEON向我指着一个人说:那是我同学.我就会知道顺其指尖方向看去所看到的那个人是他的同学.但如果,我们是先约定,他向哪个方向指,我就要顺着他肩膀的方向看过去,那就是另一回事了.关键是,前一种理解方式不是基于约定的,是无须特别说明的.而后一种就要靠约定.语言甚至只是实现交流的最后的步骤,而且并不都是必要的步骤.LEON向我仰一仰头,我可能就明白他让我向右上方看,但他也可能说:"向你的右上方看".当语句出现时,我们就要考虑比如"右上方"指称一个方位.那么仰一仰头是不是也包含了对方位的指称呢?因为"右上方"指称着一个位置,我才能基于理解而向那个方向看吗?我想,它只是获得了仰一仰头的功能,这不一定需要相应的指称.

leon

这周有事 耽误了

宇文光

(29).通过解释可以避免误解。但解释本身仍然可能被误解。
解释的解释也是……误解并不能经由某种“彻底”的解释
而被彻底的避免。可以消除的是误解，而不是误解的可能性。

《逻辑哲学论》设想了一种理想的语言。名称对应对象，
简单命题由名称组成，复合命题是简单命题的真值函式。
这里有一种要消除误解可能性的气质。

法律条文似乎也具备这种气质，因为总是有人故意要误解法律。
但法律之所以给人以“精确”的印象，真是因为那种消除误解
可能性的努力么？许多时候，法律的模糊性并不是因为其导致了
误解，而是因为考虑得不周密、没有说清楚、无法落实。
（这个要请逃犯补充指正:）

宇文光

以下是引用疯人院逃犯在2004-9-14 20:08:58的发言：
发言:
1."命名就像给一个东西贴上标签".那么我们如何给颜色贴上标签?如何给声音贴上标签?如何给感觉贴上标签?

颜色、声音用样本可以吧，感觉好像是不行

疯人院逃犯

回宇文光:1.如果误解一直发生,那么就无所谓\'解释\'了,那么也就无所谓"误解"了.
2.我觉得,误解正是发生在不模糊的地方,具有模糊性的表达式,就是那种无法确定哪种理解算得上是"误解"的表达.
法律有个司法解释和学理解释的问题.司法解释很重要.司法解释起细化,补充,和明确的作用."明确"就有进一步解释的作用.
3.颜色的样本只能是一个色板,我们只能把标签贴在色板上,但不可能贴在颜色本身"上面".(这里"颜色本身"的提法是成问题的.

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-9-29 14:04:10编辑过]

leon

[quote]以下是引用小妖在2004-9-25 23:30:41的发言：
无聊的命题,似乎挺深刻,可惜只是愚夫之思.
[/quote
什么东西“有聊”呢？

疯人院逃犯

以下是引用小妖在2004-9-25 23:30:41的发言：
无聊的命题,似乎挺深刻,可惜只是愚夫之思.

给你的建议是,少评判别人,多评判自己.

但你的话对我也有启示.哲学是爱智慧.爱的本性是自我肯定的,智慧的本性是自我否定的,所以,从事哲学思考的人就必须不断承认自己的愚蠢.

另外,如果你感到那些话"似乎挺深刻",那是很奇怪的,无论怎么看它们也没有任何"深刻性"可言.

宇文光

逃犯：1，2都同意，

      3，没有不在某个东西上的红色，但也找不到没有颜色，单独存在的桌子，
说出红色的时候，我们把物体分解了，说出桌子的时候，我们是不是也把桌子分解了？
或者说出任何一个词的时候。。。？

以下是引用疯人院逃犯在2004-9-25 13:23:55的发言：
回宇文光:1.如果误解一直发生,那么就无所谓'解释'了,那么也就无所谓"误解"了.
2.我觉得,误解正是发生在不模糊的地方,具有模糊性的表达式,就是那种无法确定哪种理解算得上是"误解"的表达.
法律有个司法解释和学理解释的问题.司法解释很重要.司法解释起细化,补充,和明确的作用."明确"就有进一步解释的作用.
3.颜色的样本只能是一个色板,我们只能把标签贴在色板上,但不可能贴在颜色本身"上面".(这里"颜色本身"的提法是成问题的.

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-9-29 14:04:10编辑过]