载个寒假准备读的书：Strawson:

缝果匠

This book is based on lectures which were originally given in Oxford University in 1954—5 and were later used as material for a seminar in Duke University, N. Carolina in ~ 5—6. I am grateful for the help I received in discussion from my colleagues at Duke; and I wish also to acknowledge my great indebtedness to Miss Ruby Meager, Professor H. L. A. Hart and Professor Gilbert Ryle, all of whom read a part or the whole of the book in manuscript and gave me much helpful and friendly advice, which I have generally tried to follow.
Much of Chapter 3 is a revised and expanded version of an article which appeared in Vol. II of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven and Grover Maxwell and published by the University of Minnesota Press in 1958. Parts of Chapters and 6 are taken, with substantial modifications, from papers which appeared in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Societ~y for 1953—4 and ~ I have to thank the editors and publishers of these volumes for permission to make use of this matter again.
P.F.S.

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION        page 9
PART I: PARTICULARS
I. BODIES        15
        1. The Identification of Particulars
                        [1] We identify particulars in speech. The identifiability of some kinds of particular may be dependent upon the identifiability of other kinds.
                        [2] Identification of particulars which are sensibly present. The identification of particulars which are not sensibly pre sent raises a theoretical problem. Its solution. 17
                        [3] The general conditions of particular-identification. These conditions are satisfiable because our knowledge of particulars forms a unified structure of a spatio-temporal character. 23
        2. Reidentification        31
        [4] A condition of our possessing such a scheme of knowledge of particulars is the ability to reidentify particulars. Scepti        cism about reidentification.        31
        [5] Reident:fication of places. 36
        3. Basic Particulars        38
        [6] A general argument to show that material bodies are the basic particulars from the point of view of identification.        38
        [7] Arguments to the same effect from the nature of different categories of particulars.        40
2. SOUNDS        59
   [1] Is the status of material bodies as basic particulars a
           necessary condition of anj scheme whatever which provides for knowledge of objective particulars?
   [2] The character of this chapter.        63
  [3] The model of the auditorj world. The problem of satisfying the conditions of a non-solipsistic consciousness.        64

3. PERSONS        87
   [1] Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything? And why to the same thing as corporeal characteristics?        87
   [2] The unique position of the personal bodj in perceptual experience described; but this does not answer these questions.        90
  [3] Cartesian and \'No-ownership\' views. The incoherence of the No-ownership view.        94
  [4] A condition of the ascription of states of consciousness to oneself is ability to ascribe them to others. The incoherence of the Cartesian view. The primitiveness of the concept of a person.        98
  [5] The logical character of a fundamental class of personal predicates.        103
   [6] The central importance of predicates ascribing actions. The idea of a ‘group mind’.        110
  [7] Disembodiment.        115
4.        MONADS        117

PART II: LOGICAL SUBJECTS
5.        SUBJECT AND PREDICATE (1): TWO CRITERIA        137

[1] The distinction between particulars and universals is traditionally associated in a certain way with the distinction between reference and predication or between subject and predicate.        137
        I. The ‘Grammatical’ Criterion
        [2] Various forms of the reference-predication or subject-predicate distinction recognized by philosophers.        139
        [3] One prima facie attractive wqy of explaining the distinction is shown to be inadequate. Viewing it as a distinction between grammatical stjles of term-introduction seems toyield more satisfactorj results.        142
[4] Quine\'s distinction in terms of the variables of quantifi cation does not at first sight offer an alternative interpretation. 153
[5] Final statement , on the present approach, of the conditions of an expression’s being a subject- or predicate-expression.
[6] The present, grammatical approach to the subject—pre dicate distinction, though it appears to harmonize with authori tatiz’e views, is not the only possible approach. 160
[7] The grammatical approach encourages scepticism both about the importance of the subject—predicate distinction and about its traditional association with the particular-universal distinction.

        2. The Category Criterion        167
        [8] Characteririzing, instantial and attributive ties: or different ways in which particular and universal terms maj collect each other in assertions.        167
        [9] A new criterion for subjects and predi cates, based on the d:fferences between particulars and universals as principles of collection of terms in assertions. The new criterion guarantees         the traditional association between the two distinctions.        171
        3. Tensions and Affinities between these Criteria
        [10] How the grammatical appearance of predicating a particu/ar is avoided in certain cases of the assertion of a characterizing tie.        173
        [11] How the grammatical appearance of predicating a particu/ar is avoided in certain cases of the assertion of an attributive tie.        176

6.        SUBJECT AND PREDICATE (2): LOGICAL SUBJECTS AND PARTICULAR OBJECTS        180

        1.        The Introduction of Particulars into Propositions 180
                [1] The introduction of a particular into a proposition re quires know/edge of an empiricalfact: the introduction of a universal does not.        180
        [2] Affinity between the grammatical and categorial criteria for subject- and predicate-expressions in part explained by a mediating distinction between ‘completeness’ and ‘incompleteness’. Once the fundamental association between the subject—predicate and particular-universal distinctions is estab        lisbed,furtber extensions of the former distinction maj be explained bj anology etc.        186
        [3] Further explanations of the idea of ‘completeness’: the presuppositions of expressions introducing particular terms.        190
        [4] Consideration and rejection of a simplified form of the above theory.        194

        2.        The Introduction of Particulars into Discourse 198
        [5] Can the above account of the conditions of introducing particulars into propositions be supplemented with an account of the conditions of introducing particulars into discourse? The conditions of success in any such attempt. 198

        [6] Feature-concepts and sortal universals: the introduction of basic particulars involves the adoption of criteria of reidentification.        202
        [7] The logical complexity of particulars and the ‘completeness’ of logical subject-expressions. Particulars the paradigm logical subjects.        210
7.         LANGUAGE WITHOUT PARTICULARS                214
[1]        In a feature-placing language the subject—predicate distinction has no place.                214
[2]        Problems involved in dispensing with ordinary particulars        217
[3]        P/aces, times and place-times as logical subjects.        221
8.        LOGICAL SUBJECTS AND EXISTENCE        226

        [1] The grammatical index of appearance in a proposition
        as an individual or logical subject. Existential prop ositions.        226
        [2] Nominalism. Why reductionist pressure on non-parti
        cular individuals varies in strength for different types of non-
        particular.        230
        [3] The nature and form of the nominalist drive. Quantifica
        tion and existence.        234
        [4] Existence and quantification.        239
        [5] Statements of identity. Pluralsubject-expressions. Refer
        ence, predication and propositions.        242
CONCLUSION        246
INDEX