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概论先验性、分析性与必然性

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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:10 |只看该作者
说一个疑问,也许很重要,在我读的《命名与必然性》(上海译文)中,根据译文,克里普克提出了先验偶然命题,但这里应该是“先验的”还是“先天的”,在我读的《纯粹理性批判》里(韦卓民译),康德的术语被译为“验前的”,我还没看到邓的译本,估计是译为“先天的”,总之与“先验的”是不同的两个概念。《命》后面没有术语索引,所以我又查了《当代哲学主流》,其中谈到克里普克,也是以“先验性”、“先验的”转译其思想。但是在徐友渔的《哥白尼式的革命》中,对这种分类又表述为“必然的”、“先天的”、“分析的”等等(我手头没带,凭记忆)。这一点应予以注意,我认为被分辨的是“必然的”、“先天的”(“验前的”)、和“分析的”,“先验的”是个很特殊的术语,内容复杂得多。


[此贴子已经被作者于2004-5-17 10:29:47编辑过]
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:10 |只看该作者
可见,对康德术语的理解困难重重,起码有四项障碍,1、来自康德著作自身的,作为一个系统,术语间充满隐含的限定关系,而且他对术语的解释在不同层次上反复出现,甚至可能有自相矛盾;2、来自解释者的;3、来自后人将其术语引为己用;4、来自翻译的错误和不统一。
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:10 |只看该作者
能看到影印本的朋友最好帮查查,其实克里普克  有一则注释,但讲的似乎不够清楚?
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:11 |只看该作者
我对照过了,我手头的《纯批》是武汉华中师大1999年版本,译者是韦卓民,他翻译得还是比较明确的,导论里最早出现的名词是Apriori,翻译成“验前”与“先天”,指组织经验的能力本身,其后论述的是Transcendent、Transcendental,翻译成“超验”与“先验的”,指不依赖于经验基础的任何形式与质料。
我觉得,Transcendent的外延比Apriori要广,Apriori跟康德其他部分所说的知性其实是同一的名称,而Transcendent不仅包括形式的知性,也包括作为内容的某些质料。或者说,所有的Aprior都是Transcendent,但有的Transcendent不是Aprior。Aprior是神秘主义的形而上学的,Transcendent则认识论的语义性的。
《命名与必然性》不在手边,如果我没有记错的话,克里普克的意思是,暂且悬置Aprior是什么、Aprior如何可能的问题,把讨论仅限于是否存在不为经验证实或证伪,或者说得更“可能世界”一些,就是与状态描述语句无关的命题,这样的命题与分析综合的关系如何,可见,他讨论的是Transcendent。
糟糕的是,我记得好多译作并没有区分清楚Aprior和Transcendent。
Namo-Saptanam Samyaksambuddha kotinam Tadyata Om Cale Cule Cundhe Svaha
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:11 |只看该作者
邓本是汉德对照:先天的a priori,先验的transzendental,超验的transzendent。克里普克的先验偶然命题如果译的准确的话应是transcendental。对对英文版或德文版就能一目了然了。老师上课时说先天的和先验的二者区别的最简便的办法就是先验的可以应用于经验,先天的不能应用于经验。邓晓芒著的《纯粹理性批判指要》这样区分先天知识和先验知识:“先验知识是一类特殊的先天知识,即关于先天知识的先天知识。。。换言之,先验知识是从先天方面来研究认识论问题所得到的具有真理性的认识论知识,而一般的先天知识则是关于经验的对象的,并不一定涉及认识论问题。”   即认为先验知识是为先天知识提供先天论证的知识。  至于超验和另外两个怎么区别我现在也不大清楚。
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:11 |只看该作者
Glossary of Kant\'s Technical Terms
康德技术用于汇编

by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)





      The following Glossary lists Kant\'s most important technical terms, to­gether with a simple definition of each. (The terms \'judicial\', \'perspective\' and \'standpoint\' are the only ones Kant himself does not use as technical terms.) It was originally written as a study aide to help make the intricate web of Kant\'s termi­nology comprehensible to students who had little or no fa­mil­iar­i­ty with Kant\'s writings. Where relevant, the opposite term is given in curved brackets at the end of the definition. When a word defined herein (or a slight­ly different form of such a word) is used in the course of defining some other word in this Glossary, its first occurrence in that definition will be in italics.



a posteriori(后天的): a way of gaining knowledge by appealing to some particular experience(s). This method is used to establish empirical and hypothetical truths. (Cf. a priori.)



a priori(先天的): a way of gaining knowledge without appealing to any particular experience(s). This method is used to establish transcendental and logical truths. (Cf. a posteriori.)



aesthetic(感性、感受性): having to do with sense-perception. In the first Critique this word refers to space and time as the necessary conditions for sense-perception. The first half of the third Critique examines the subjective purposiveness in our perception of beautiful or sublime objects in order to construct a system of aesthetic judgment. (Cf. teleological.)



analysis(分析): division of a representation into two opposing representations, with a view towards clarifying the original representation. Philosophy as metaphysics employs analysis more than synthesis. (Cf. synthesis.)  



analytic(分析的): a statement or an item of knowledge which is true solely because of its conformity to some logical laws. (Cf. synthetic.)



appearance: an object of experience, when viewed from the transcendental perspective. Though often used as a synonym for phenomenon, it technically refers to an object considered to be conditioned by space and time, but not by the categories. (Cf. thing in itself.)



architectonic: the logical structure given by reason (especially through the use of twofold and threefold divisions), which the philosopher should use as a plan to organize the contents of any system.



autonomy: an action which is determined by the subject\'s own free choice (see will). In the second Critique, moral action is defined as being au­tono­mous. (Cf. heteronomy.)



categorical imperative( 绝对命令): a command which expresses a general, unavoid­able requirement of the moral law. Its three forms express the requirements of universalizability, respect and autonomy. Together they establish that an action is properly called \'morally good\' only if (1) we can will all persons to do it, (2) it enables us to treat other persons as ends and not merely as the means to our own selfish ends, and (3) it allows us to see other persons as mutual law-makers in an ideal \'realm of ends\'.



categories(范畴): the most general concepts, in terms of which every object must be viewed in order for it to become an object of empirical knowledge. The four main categories (quantity, quality, relation and modality) each have three sub-categories, forming a typical example of a twelvefold, architectonic pattern. (Cf. space and time.)



concept(概念): the active species of representation, by means of which our under­standing enables us to think. By requiring perceptions to conform to the categories, concepts serve as \'rules\' allowing us to perceive general relations be­tween representations. (Cf. intuition.)



conscience: the faculty of the human subject which enforces the moral law in a particular way for each individual by providing an awareness of what is right and wrong in each situation.



constitutive(构成性): playing a fundamental role in making up some type of knowledge. (Cf. regulative.)



Copernican revolution(哥白尼革命): in astronomy, the theory that the earth revolves around the sun; in philosophy, the (analogous) theory that the subject of knowledge does not remain at rest, but revolves around (i.e., actively deter­mines certain aspects of) the object. Thus, the formal characteristics of the empirical world (i.e., space and time and the categories) are there only because the subject\'s mind puts them there, transcendentally.



Critical(批判的): Kant\'s lifelong approach to philosophy which distinguishes be­tween different perspectives and then uses such distinctions to settle otherwise unresolvable disputes. The Critical approach is not primarily negative, but is an attempt to adjudicate quarrels by showing the ways in which both sides have a measure of validity, once their perspective is properly understood. Kant\'s system of Critical philosophy emphasizes the importance of examin­ing the structure and limitations of reason itself.



Critique(批判): to use the method of synthesis together with a critical approach to doing philosophy. This term appears in the titles of the three main books in Kant\'s Critical philosophy, which adopt the theoretical, practical and judicial standpoints, respectively. The purpose of Critical philosophy is to prepare a secure foundation for metaphysics. (Cf. metaphysics.)



disposition: the tendency a person has at a given point in time to act in one way or another (i.e., to obey the moral law or to disobey it). (Cf. predis­position.)



duty: an action which we are obligated to perform out of respect for the moral law.



empirical(经验性的): one of Kant\'s four main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which is both synthetic and a posteriori. Most of the knowledge we gain through ordinary experience, or through science, is empirical. \'This table is brown\' is a typical empirical statement. (Cf. transcendental).



experience(经验): the combination of an intuition with a concept in the form of a judgment. \'Experience\' in this \'mediate\' sense is a synonym for \'empirical knowledge\'. The phrase \'possible experience\' refers to a representation which is presented to our sensibility through intuition, but is not yet known, because it has not been presented to our understanding through concepts. \'Experience\' in this sense is \'immediate\' and contrasts with \'knowledge\'.



faculty(能力): a fundamental power of human subjects to do something or perform some rational function.



faith(信仰、信念): a rational attitude towards a potential object of knowledge which arises when we are subjectively certain it is true even though we are unable to gain theo­retical or objective certainty. By contrast, knowledge implies objective and subjective certainty, while opinion is the state of having neither objective nor subjective certainty. Kant encouraged a more humble approach to philoso­phy by claiming to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith-i.e., by dis­­tinguishing between what we can know empirically and what is transcen­dent, which we can approach only by means of faith.



formal: the active or subjective aspect of something-that is, the aspect which is based on the rational activity of the subject. (Cf. material.)



heteronomy: an action which is determined by some outside influence (i.e., some force other than the freedom given by practical reason, such as inclina­tion) impelling the subject to act in a certain way. Such action is nonmoral (i.e., neither moral nor immoral). (Cf. autonomy.)



hypothetical(假言的): one of Kant\'s four main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which is both analytic and a posteriori (though Kant him­self wrongly identified it as synthetic and a priori). Most metaphysical knowledge is properly viewed from this perspective, instead of from the spec­ulative perspective of traditional metaphysics. \'There is a God\' is a typical hypothetical statement. (Cf. logical).



ideas(理念): the species of representation which gives rise to metaphysical beliefs. Ideas are special concepts which arise out of our knowledge of the empirical world, yet seem to point beyond nature to some transcendent realm. The three most important metaphysical ideas are God, freedom and immortality.



imagination(想象力): the faculty responsible for forming concepts out of the \'manifold of intuition\' and for synthesizing intuitions with concepts to form objects which are ready to be judged.



inclination: the faculty or object which motivates a person to act in a heteronomous way. Following inclinations is neither morally good nor morally bad, except when doing so directly prevents a person from acting ac­cording to duty-i.e., only when choosing to obey an inclination results in  disobedience to the moral law.



intelligible(知性的、智性的、理智的): presented to the subject without any material being provided by sensibility. It is more or less equivalent to the terms supersensible and transcendent. (Cf. sensible.)



intuition(直观): the passive species of representation, by means of which our sen­sibility enables to have sensations. By requiring appearances to be given in space and time, intuitions allow us to perceive particular relations between representations, thereby limiting empirical knowledge to the sensible realm. (Cf. concept.)



judgment(判断、判断力): in the first Critique, the use of the understanding by which an object is determined to be empirically real, through a synthesis of intuitions and concepts. The third Critique examines the form of our feelings of pleasure and displeasure in order to construct a system based on the faculty of judg­ment (= the judicial standpoint) in its aesthetic and teleological manifesta­tions.  (Cf. reason.)



judicial: one of Kant\'s three main standpoints, relating primarily to experi­ence-i.e., to what we feel, as opposed to what we know or desire to do. Judicial reason is virtually synonymous with \'Critique\' itself, and is con­cerned with questions about the most profound ways in which we experience the world. Finding the source of two examples of such experiences is the task of the third Critique. (Cf. theoretical and practical.)



knowledge(知识): the final goal of the understanding in combining intuitions and concepts. If they are pure, the knowledge will be transcendental; if they are impure, the knowledge will be empirical. In a looser sense, \'knowledge\' also refers to that which arises out adopting any legitimate perspective.



logical(逻辑的): one of Kant\'s four main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which is both analytic and a priori. Hence it is concerned with nothing but the relationships between concepts. The law of noncontradiction (A is not -A) is the fundamental law of traditional, Aristotelian logic. (If we call this \'analytic\' logic, then \'synthetic\' logic would be based on the oppo­site law of \'contradiction\' [A is -A].) \'All bachelors are unmarried\' is a typical logical statement. (Cf. hypothetical.)



material: the passive or objective aspect of something-that is, the aspect which is based on the experience a subject has, or on the objects given in such an experience. (Cf. formal.)



maxim(准则): the material rule or principle used to guide a person in a particular situation about what to do (e.g., \'I should never tell a lie\'). It thus provides a kind of bridge between a persons inner disposition and outer actions.



metaphysics(形而上学): the highest form of philosophy, which attempts to gain knowledge of the ideas. Because the traditional, speculative perspective fails to succeed in this task, Kant suggests a new, hypothetical perspective for metaphysics. Metaphysics can succeed only when it is preceded by Critique. (Cf. Critique.)



moral law: the one \'fact\' of practical reason, which is in every rational per­son, though some people are more aware of it than others. The moral law, in essence, is our knowledge of the difference between good and evil, and our in­ner conviction that we ought to do what is good. (See categorical impera­tive.)



noumenon: the name given to a thing when it is viewed as a transcendent object. The term \'negative noumenon\' refers only to the recognition of some­thing which is not an object of sensible intuition, while \'positive noumenon\' refers to the (quite mistaken) attempt to know such a thing as an empirical object. These two terms are sometimes used loosely as synonyms for \'transcendental object\' and \'thing in itself\', respectively. (Cf. phenomenon.)



object(客体、对象): a general term for any \'thing\' which is conditioned by the subject\'s representation, and so is capable of being known. The thing in itself is a thing which cannot become an object. (Cf. subject; see thing in itself.)



objective(客观的): related more to the object or representation out of which knowl­edge is constructed than to the subject possessing the knowledge. Considered transcendentally, objective knowledge is less certain than subjective knowl­edge; considered empirically, objective knowledge is more certain. (Cf. sub­jective.)

perspective: a way of thinking about or considering something; or a set of assumptions from which an object can be viewed. Knowing which perspec­tive is assumed is important because the same question can have different an­swers if different perspectives are assumed. Kant himself does not use this word, but he uses a number of other expressions (such as standpoint, way of thinking, employment of understanding, etc.) in precisely this way. The main Critical perspectives are the transcendental, empirical, logical and hypothetical.



phenomenon(现象): the object of knowledge, viewed empirically, in its fully knowable state (i.e., conditioned by space and time and the categories). (Cf. noumenon.)



practical(实践的): one of Kant\'s three main standpoints, relating primarily to action -i.e., to what we desire to do as opposed to what we know or feel. Practical reason is a synonym for will; and these two terms are concerned with ques­tions of morality. Finding the sources of such action is the task of the second Critique. (Cf. theoretical and judicial.)



predisposition: the natural tendency a person has, apart from (or before having) any experience, to be morally good or evil. (Cf. disposition.)



pure(纯粹的): not mixed with anything sensible. Although its proper opposite is \'impure\', Kant normally opposes \'pure\' to \'empirical\'.



rational(理性的): grounded in the faculty of reason rather than in sensibility. (See also intelligible.)



reality(实在性): if regarded from the empirical perspective, this refers to the ordinary world of nature; if regarded from the transcendental perspective, it refers to the transcendent realm of the noumenon.



reason(理性): in the first Critique, the highest faculty of the human subject, to which all other faculties are subordinated. It abstracts completely from the conditions of sensibility. The second Critique examines the form of our de­sires in order to construct a system based on the faculty of reason (= the prac­tical standpoint). Reason\'s primary function is practical; its theoretical func­tion, though often believed to be more important, should be viewed as having a secondary importance. (Cf. judgment.)



regulative(调节性的): providing important guidelines for how knowledge should be used, yet not itself playing any fundamental role in making up that knowl­edge. (Cf. constitutive.)



religion: the way of acting, or perspective, according to which we interpret all our duties as divine commands.



representation(联想): the most general word for an object at any stage in its de­termination by the subject, or for the subjective act of forming the object at that level. The main types of representations are intuitions, concepts and ideas.



schematism(图型法): the function of the faculty of imagination, through which concepts and intuitions are combined, or synthesized, according to a rule (called a schema). In the first Critique, this function is presented as one of the steps required in order for the understanding to produce empirical knowledge.



sensibility(感觉): the faculty concerned with passively receiving objects. This is accomplished primarily in the form of physical and mental sensations (via \'outer sense\' and \'inner sense\', respectively). However, such sensations are possible only if the objects are intuited, and intuition depends on space and time existing in their pure form as well. (Cf. understanding.)



sensible(感性的): presented to the subject by means of sensibility. (Cf. intelligible.)



space and time(空间与时间): considered from the empirical perspective, they form the context in which objects interact outside of us; considered from the transcen­dental perspective, they are pure, so they exist inside of us as conditions of knowledge. (Cf. categories.)



speculative: the illusory perspective which wrongly uses reason in a hope­less attempt to gain knowledge about something transcendent. Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of theoretical.



standpoint: the special type of perspective which determines the point from which a whole system of perspectives is viewed. The main Critical stand­points are the theoretical, practical and judicial.



subject(主体): a general term for any rational person who is capable of having knowledge. (Cf. object; see also representation.)



subjective(主体的): related more to the subject than to the object or representation out of which knowledge is constructed. Considered transcendentally, subjec­tive knowledge is more certain that objective knowledge; considered empiri­cally, subjective knowledge is less certain. (Cf. objective.)



summum bonum: Latin for highest good. This is the ultimate goal of the moral system presented in the second Critique; it involves the ideal distribu­tion of happiness in exact proportion to each person\'s virtue. In order to con­ceive of its possibility, we must postulate the existence of God and human immortality, thus giving these ideas practical reality.



supersensible: see intelligible and transcendent.



synthesis(综合): integration of two opposing representations into one new repre­sentation, with a view towards constructing a new level of the object\'s real­ity. Philosophy as Critique employs synthesis more than analysis. On the operation of synthesis in the first Critique, see imagination. (Cf. analysis.)



synthetic(综合的): a statement or item of knowledge which is known to be true because of its connection with some intuition. (Cf. analytic.)



system(体系): a set of basic facts or arguments (called \'elements\') arranged accord­ing to the order of their logical relationships, as determined by the architec­ton­ic patterns of reason. Kant\'s Critical philosophy is a System made up of three sub­ordinate systems, each defined by a distinct standpoint, and each made up of the same four perspectives.



teleological: having to do with purposes or ends. The second half of the third Critique examines the objective purposiveness in our perception of natural organisms in order to construct a system of teleological judgment.



theoretical(理论的): one of Kant\'s three main standpoints, relating primarily to cognition-i.e., to what we know as opposed to what we feel or desire to do. Theoretical reason is concerned with questions about our knowledge of the ordinary world (the world science seeks to understand). Finding the source of such knowledge is the task of the first Critique, which would best be entitled the Critique of Pure \'Theoretical\' Reason. (Cf. practical and judicial; see speculative.)



thing in itself(物自身、物自体): an object considered transcendentally apart from all the conditions under which a subject can gain knowledge of it. Hence the thing in itself is, by definition, unknowable. Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of noumenon. (Cf. appearance.)



time(时间): see space and time.



transcendent(超验的): the realm of thought which lies beyond the boundary of pos­sible knowledge, because it consists of objects which cannot be presented to us in intuition-i.e., objects which we can never experience with our senses (sometimes called noumena). The closest we can get to gaining knowledge of the transcendent realm is to think about it by means of ideas. (The opposite of \'transcendent\' is \'immanent\'.)



transcendental(先验的): one of Kant\'s four main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which is both synthetic and a priori. It is a special type of philosophical knowledge, concerned with the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. However, Kant believes all knowing subjects assume certain transcendental truths, whether or not they are aware of it. Transcendental knowledge defines the boundary between empirical knowledge and speculation about the transcendent realm. \'Every event has a cause\' is a typical transcendental statement. (Cf. empirical.)



transcendental object(先验对象): an object considered transcendentally insofar as it has been presented to a subject, but is not yet represented in any determined way-i.e., not yet influenced by space and time or by the categories. Also called an \'object in general\'.



understanding(知性): in the first Critique, the faculty concerned with actively producing knowledge by means of concepts. This is quite similar to what is normally called the mind. It gives rise to the logical perspective, which en­ables us to compare concepts with each other, and to the empirical perspective (where it is also called judgment), which enables us to combine concepts with intuitions in order to produce empirical knowledge. The first Critique exam­ines the form of our cognitions in order to construct a system based on the faculty of understanding (= the theoretical standpoint). (Cf. sensibility.)



will: the manifestation of reason in its practical form (see practical). The two German words, \'Willkür\' and \'Wille\' can both be translated in English as \'will\'. Willkür refers to the faculty of choice, which for Kant is just one (empirical) function of the more fundamental faculty of practical reason (= Wille).

基本上对照的差不多了,各位发现错误及时纠正。














































[此贴子已经被作者于2004-5-26 1:34:30编辑过]
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:32 |只看该作者
一些关系:

先天还是可以经验性的感知,但感知的根据无法以经验的方式构造性实现。

所以对于先天,以最坚定的科学主义立场来看,这不过是个概念黑盒子:由于你不知道黑盒的内在机理,就把整个黑盒子统一当做先天来处理掉。

先验是个以非经验的方式构造性实现的猜想。由于康德提供不了任何推理基础,所以他等于是交了个白卷,后来的胡塞尔提出可穿透的意向性结构,但毕竟胡受过专业数学训练,所以就没有信口开河。

因此,我觉得有必要用奥康的小刀刀把这两个愚蠢而不中用的混乱概念全部从分析哲学里剔除出去,黑格尔他们这些脓包才需要它们,因为他们需要进入嗑药状态。

我忽然发现,我在公司可以上黑蓝。

问大家好。~
太空里,要是有一个巧克力做的冰淇淋月球,该多好啊~
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:32 |只看该作者
呀,豹子头回来啦~~~
Namo-Saptanam Samyaksambuddha kotinam Tadyata Om Cale Cule Cundhe Svaha
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:32 |只看该作者
"如无必要毋增概念"-----另一把小刀刀?但康德还是提出了许多理由来说明给出"先验这个那个"的必要性的.
引一段尼采的话:"世间存在愤怒的废话,常见于路德和叔本华.因为概念和公式太多而产生另一种废话,康德便属这种情形.因为喜欢用不同的说法来表达同一事物又产生第三种废话,蒙田便是佐证.第四种废话来自于不良的本性.
     .........."

七格斑竹,你好啊,克服电脑之诅咒了吗?
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发表于 2007-8-4 13:08:48 |只看该作者
没有,只是在公司上网的说。
抱歉,把实体打成概念了。
我发现尼采很有自我反思意识啊~ ^o^
zen跟我提起你和leon时总是赞不绝口,看来我们得找机会四个人一起坐下来喝酒的说。
王晨端菜。


[此贴子已经被作者于2004-5-26 13:50:44编辑过]
太空里,要是有一个巧克力做的冰淇淋月球,该多好啊~
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